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Abstract 
Preference-based decisions are essential for survival, for instance when deciding what 
we should (not) eat. Despite their importance, preference-based decisions are 
surprisingly variable and can appear irrational in ways that have defied mechanistic 
explanations. Here we propose that subjective valuation results from an inference 
process that accounts for the structure of values in the environment and that maximizes 
information in value representations in line with demands imposed by limited coding 
resources. A model of this inference process explains the variability in both subjective 
value reports and preference-based choices, and predicts a new preference illusion that 
we validate with empirical data. Interestingly, the same model explains the level of 
confidence associated with these reports. Our results imply that preference-based 
decisions reflect information-maximizing transmission and statistically optimal decoding 
of subjective values by a limited-capacity system. These findings provide a unified 
account of how humans perceive and valuate the environment to optimally guide 
behavior. 
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Introduction 
At any given moment, organisms receive much more sensory and interoceptive 
information than they can physically process. These capacity limitations are thought to 
have biased brain evolution towards information-processing strategies that are maximally 
efficient for the control of behavior, an idea known as efficient coding1,2. Such efficient-
coding strategies can be observed in sensory systems where the precision with which 
neural representations encode different states of an environmental variable (e.g., different 
orientations) is proportional to the frequency with which this state is actually 
encountered3,4. This strategy ensures that the information encoded is as great as possible 
given the dynamic range of the physical system used to represent it5. However, these 
representations not only need to be efficiently encoded but also need to be decoded and 
interpreted so that the resulting percepts provide maximally accurate information about 
the state of the world and the organism. Bayesian statistics imply that optimal perceptual 
processes would have to combine the representation of the environmental information 
(i.e., the likelihood of a state) with an a-priori expectation of these states6–8. While efficient 
coding and Bayesian decoding theories may appear related, they have only recently been 
combined in a unified theoretical framework that can account for various low-level 
perceptual biases4,9. But whether similar encoding and decoding strategies also operate 
in other domains than low-level perceptual systems remains an open question. 
 In the domain of preference-based decisions, it is commonly assumed that 
organisms rely on strategies that maximize the utility of the chosen option, based on 
stable and accurate representations of preferences that are not systematically affected 
by processing-resource constraints. However, empirically-observed choice behavior 
often deviates from the predictions of rational choice theory10. Purely descriptive theories 
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of such anomalies have been offered, postulating either competition between parallel 
action-selection processes based on simple heuristics10 or some type of arbitrary external 
noise that has no clear psychological or neural basis11–13. While such theories can 
account for some observed effects of choice variability, biases, or confidence in 
isolation11–15, a common framework linking these different aspects of behavior is largely 
missing. Moreover, these models sometimes contain assumptions about value 
representations that appear implausible given the constraints imposed by the limited-
capacity nature of biological systems.  
In order to account for these limitations, recent work has sought to find shared 
principles in the mechanisms underlying subjective valuation and sensory perception11–
13,16–21. Theories from this line of research have suggested that subjective value 
representations may resemble percepts in that they are derived by inference processes 
that exploit prior information about the relevant distribution of value stimuli in the 
environment16,17,19,21. Moreover, related lines of work suggest that neural reward circuits 
can flexibly adapt to different value contexts in the evironment22–25, possibly consistent 
with the notion that neural resources are allocated efficiently to the encoding of subjective 
values. However, it is unknown whether efficient coding and Bayesian decoding principles 
are indeed used jointly to generate preference-representations, and it is unclear whether 
this information-processing scheme can explain the variability, biases, and confidence in 
value-based decisions in humans. This lack of knowledge may reflect that the distribution 
of subjective values in the natural environment is not easily measurable (in contrast to 
corresponding distributions of sensory signals26), since it depends on the long-term 
experience of each specific organism with the objects in its environment25. 
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Here we propose a way to test whether preference-based decisions are indeed 
guided by a value representation scheme that combines both efficient coding and 
Bayesian-decoding principles. We achieve this by introducing a novel approach for 
studying subjective valuation that takes account of the important fact that neither decision 
makers nor experimenters have direct access to the “true” stimulus values underlying all 
value-related behaviors (e.g., ratings and choices). We demonstrate with modelling and 
behavioral experiments that choice variability, biases, and confidence in human 
preference-based decisions can all be explained by a single value-inference process. 
This process maximizes information transmission by optimally allocating limited 
resources to value representations, based on prior knowledge about the distribution of 
object values in the individual environment. Our approach accounts comprehensively for 
several aspects of value judgements and value-based choices and proposes that humans 
may make value-based choices optimally given resource constraints.  
 
Results 
Efficient coding of subjective value 
In studies of perceptual decisions, experimenters usually have complete knowledge of 
any experimental stimulus value 𝑣 (for instance, the angular orientation of displayed 
Gabor patches). This is different in experiments studying value-based choices, since 
experimenters have no direct access to the “true” value 𝑣 of the presented object to an 
observer (Fig. 1a). Here we assume that this “true” value 𝑣 has been shaped by each 
observer’s personal history of experiences with this type of object and is therefore entirely 
subjective. A common strategy adopted by experimenters is thus to first derive an 
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estimate 𝑣" of this subjective value - based on empirical choices or subjective reports (Fig. 
1a) - that is subsequently used as input to a decision model11,12,14,15,27–29. However, we 
will show that this strategy is suboptimal because the value estimates 𝑣" are likely to be 
as inaccurate and biased as the subsequent choices. This is because the observer herself 
does not have direct access to the “true” value 𝑣 – after all, she does not have perfect 
memory of all her lifetime experiences. Thus, the observer needs to derive an estimate 
of the object’s value 𝑣 every time this is necessary, for instance when having to rate this 
value or when choosing between this object and another one. Any noise and bias resulting 
from encoding/decoding processes used to infer this value estimate should thus affect 
any type of behavior in similar ways. Given these limitations, we elaborate a new 
approach that yields more precise estimates of subjective values for the study of 
preference-based decisions, based on the principles of efficient coding and Bayesian 
decoding.   
 We model valuation as a probabilistic inference process incorporating both 
encoding and decoding (Fig. 1a; see Methods for full details). Presentation of an object 
with “true” stimulus value 𝑣 elicits an internal noisy response 𝑟 (encoding) that is used by 
the observer to generate a subjective value estimate 𝑣"(𝑟) (decoding) that is reported 
behaviorally (Fig. 1a). In experimental settings, such behavioral reports typically have to 
be given on physically bounded rating scales11,12,14,15,27 that can differ across different 
settings. To account for this step, we assume that the individual’s internal subjective scale 
for 𝑣"(𝑟) is physically unbounded but can be flexibly mapped via a function 𝑔(𝑣") to any 
bounded scale in line with experimental demands (Methods).  
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Inspired by previous work in the perceptual domain9, we assume that encoding of 
subjective values is efficient in the sense that the mutual information between the stimulus 
values 𝑣 and the internal response	𝑟 is maximized. This results in optimal use of the 
underlying neuronal scale given the expected/learned natural distribution of values in the 
given environment, i.e., the prior 𝑝(𝑣). Different from work in the perceptual domain and 
standard approaches in neuroeconomic studies, we suppose that the experimenter has 
no knowledge about the specific stimulus value 𝑣) that generated the reported rating scale 
value 𝑣* = 𝑔(𝑣"). However, if the experimenter obtains several value ratings 𝑣* for a given 
good (and if she repeats this for the full distribution of goods in a given context or 
environment), then it is possible to infer the stimulus value 𝑣) that is most likely to have 
generated the observed rating distribution for that good (Methods and Supplementary 
Fig. 1). Moreover, if individuals employ this encoding approach, then inferred values 𝑣 
based on the rating data should predict subsequent choice behavior in a multi-choice 
task. For instance, in a two-alternative choice task, the optimal strategy is to choose good 
1 over good 2 if 𝑣", > 𝑣"., where the value estimates (𝑣",, 𝑣".) are the Bayesian posterior 
means of each good, respectively (see Methods). 
One can also make predictions of choice discriminability between two objects 
based on their position in the rating scale (Fig. 1b,c). If the prior distribution has higher 
density over low subjective values, then predicted discriminability resembles a u-shaped 
function, but with higher choice accuracy for lower-valued goods (Fig. 1b). On the other 
hand, if the prior distribution has higher density over high subjective values, then higher 
choice accuracy should be observed for higher-valued goods (Fig. 1c). Interestingly, the 
latter prediction would be diametrically opposite to predictions based on Weber’s law8, 
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which generally assumes that higher value magnitudes should lead to poorer 
discrimination. Our efficient coding theory implies that Weber’s Law should hold in the 
case of a particular kind of prior distribution that may be realistic for some sensory 
magnitudes, but not for the distribution of values for consumption goods assumed here. 
Subjective value rating and choice behavior 
In a first behavioral experiment (Experiment 1), we presented a set of food items to n=38 
study participants and asked them to indicate on a continuous rating scale their 
preference to consume the presented item (Fig 2a; Methods). Crucially, the participants 
were familiar with the food products and had seen all of them before the ratings took 
place, ensuring that they could effectively use the full range of the rating scale. The 
products (M=64 goods) were a representative sample of products typically encountered 
in the two biggest supermarket chains in Switzerland. Nevertheless, we ensured prior to 
testing that participants were indeed familiar with all products (Methods).  
 We then asked participants to rate the same items a second time, but crucially, 
they had been unaware that this second rating phase was going to take place, thus 
allowing a clean estimation of variability in the decoded values (Methods, Fig. 2b). We 
tested whether this variability actually reflected the value coding/decoding operations 
rather than just random noise or an artifact of the bounded rating scale. To this end, the 
same participants underwent a series of incentive-compatible choices in which they 
selected from pairs of the previously-rated food items the one item they preferred to eat. 
We defined a consistent choice as a trial in which the subject chose the item they had 
assigned a higher average rating across the two previous ratings. Choice consistency 
was affected by the value difference between the two items’ prior ratings: The higher the 
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value difference, the more consistent the choices (multiple logistic regression, 
βRandEffects=0.44±0.05, P<0.001; Fig. 2d). This concurs with the long-held notion that 
stronger evidence leads to more consistent choices11,12. Importantly, choice consistency 
also depended on the variability in the value ratings: The higher this variability for the 
items on a given trial, the less consistent the decision (βRandEffects = -0.21±0.05, P<0.001; 
Fig. 2d). Extending this trial-to-trial effect of rating variability, we observed that each 
participant’s average level of variability in the rating task was negatively correlated with 
the slope of the logistic regression of her individual choices on the items’ mean value 
difference (βrobust = -0.77±0.20, P<0.001; Fig. 2e). In other words, the higher the variability 
in the initial value ratings, the less consistent the subsequent choices between the rated 
items, both compared across trials and across participants. This already suggests that 
properties of the value coding/decoding operations can somehow affect preference-
based choices, but it does not characterize by what mechanisms they may influence the 
observed decisions. In the next sections, we will address this question by formal tests of 
the theoretical framework outlined in our model specification. 
In Experiment 1, the rating scale was continuous and without numerical cues (Fig. 
2a). One may wonder whether rating variability might represent imprecisions in the 
participants’ assignment of the decoded subjective values to this rating line. We therefore 
conducted a second experiment (Experiment 2, n=37) in which the rating scale was 
divided into discrete steps with explicitly assigned numerical values (Fig. 2a; Methods). 
The variability in ratings across this scale clearly resembled the shape observed in 
Experiment 1 (Fig. 2c) and had a similar significant impact on choice behavior (βRandEffects 
= -0.25±0.05, P<0.001; Fig. 2d). Again, each participant’s level of variability in the rating 
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task correlated negatively with the slope of the regression of choice consistency on value 
difference between the goods (βrobust = -1.2±0.25, P<0.001; Fig. 2f). Thus, the influence 
of rating variability on subsequent choices does not depend on specifics of the rating 
procedure but may reflect characteristics of the noisy coding/decoding operations used 
by the observer to estimate the subjective value. 
 
Testing the efficient coding hypothesis 
We now investigate to what extent the observed rating variability in Experiments 1 and 2 
can be explained by the efficient coding model. We started by inferring the values 𝑣(,,⋯,1) 
of each good 𝑚 that maximized the likelihood of the observed set of ratings for each 
participant (Methods). In Experiments 1 and 2, the rating data set consisted of M=64 and 
M=61 goods respectively, with N=2 ratings for each good. The fitted model successfully 
captured the empirically-observed rating variability (Fig 2b-c) and the distribution of 
subjective value estimates 𝑣" (Supplementary Fig. 2). We compared the quality of these 
efficient-coding model fits with those of a simple flexible model that assumes constant 
Gaussian noise over the rating scale with no prior distribution constraints on the values 𝑣(,,⋯,1). For both Experiments 1 and 2, the efficient coding model explained the rating 
distribution better than the alternative model (Supplementary Fig. 3). 
Exploration of the rating data revealed that the distribution of ratings was highly 
variable across participants (Supplementary Figs. 4,5), perhaps indicating that each 
individual holds different priors over values due to different long-term experience. The 
inferred prior distributions for both experiments based on our model revealed that the 
expected value of the prior across the population was shifted towards higher values (Fig. 
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2b,c). Choice discriminability should therefore resemble the shape predicted in Figure 1c. 
If the subjective values of the products are derived using efficient-coding principles, then 
using the framework described above should allow us to predict each individual’s 
preference-based decisions. It is important to emphasize that for these prediction 
analyses, we fixed for each participant the parameters of the prior distribution 𝑝(𝑣) and 
the stimulus values 𝑣(,,⋯,1) to the specific values obtained when fitting the model to the 
separate rating data. Using these out-of-sample parameters and values, and only 
adjusting the encoder and external noise, our model did a good job at predicting the 
choice data (Fig. 2g,h) as suggested by both the qualitative predictions and leave-one-
out cross-validation metrics (Methods and Supplementary Note 1). To determine which 
aspects of the operations formalized in the efficient-coding model are most relevant for 
explaining behavior, we compared the predictive power of our model to that of alternative 
models (Supplementary Note 1). For both experiments, the efficient coding model 
predicted the data best, as suggested by both the qualitative predictions and leave-one-
out cross-validation metrics (Supplementary Note 1). 
It may be argued that the specific pattern of observed choices in our experiments 
could also be captured by a model that does not contain efficient coding but instead fits 
the full shape of the likelihood function to the observed data, as done e.g. in in previous 
work on perceptual discrimination26.  However, it is important to emphasize that our 
approach does not require us to fit arbitrary shapes of likelihood functions, as these 
shapes naturally arise from the efficient-coding formalized in our model, which only 
requires fit of one free parameter: Noise in the efficient-coding space (for a detailed 
discussion of this topic see Supplementary Note 2).  Thus, the explanatory power of our 
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model does not reflect the general flexibility of Bayesian inference per se but specifically 
relates to the efficient coding of values embedded in the Bayesian inference process. 
The results presented so far suggest that subjective-value representations guiding 
human preference-based decisions are inferred and employed optimally using both 
efficient coding and Bayesian decoding. However, it remains unclear whether internal 
noise due to efficient coding is the main factor explaining fluctuations and potential biases 
in subjective value estimations. We investigate this issue in the following section. 
 
Illusions of subjective value 
The theory used here predicts in general that for a stimulus with value 𝑣) near the peak 
of the prior, the subjective value estimate 𝑣" (and the resulting rating 𝑣*) should be biased 
away from the prior, with the strength of this bias determined by the degree of noise in 
the internal representations used for inference9. We thus investigated whether a 
conceptually similar type of bias emerges during subjective value estimation, reflecting 
an expectation-induced preference illusion and further supporting efficient coding of 
subjective value.  
The estimation of this valuation bias necessarily requires knowledge of the exact 
stimulus value 𝑣) that serves as input on any given trial, which is difficult in our case since 
the experimenter does not have direct access to 𝑣) (Fig. 1a). In order to cope with this 
problem, we first derived predictions of the estimation bias for different levels of internal 
noise 𝜎 in the value representations. We assumed that this noise varies with the stimulus 
presentation times, based on theoretical frameworks postulating that value estimates are 
constructed using samples from memories/emotions associated with the physical 
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features of the objects30. This suggests that a reduction in visual stimulation time should 
reduce the number of samples that can be drawn and should therefore increase the noise 
in the internal value representations31. To make this intuition explicit, we formulated a 
mathematical proof confirming that the number of discrete samples (e.g., memories) that 
can be drawn over time is inversely proportional to the level of encoding noise in a 
capacity-limited system (Supplementary Note 3). Crucially, this proof provides a 
normative foundation for the theoretical frameworks30–32 motivating our approach and 
confirms the validity of the assumptions underlying our simulations and experimental 
strategy.  
In order to derive initial qualitative predictions for the value estimation bias for 
different presentation times – and therefore levels of encoding noise – we performed 
model simulations using the prior 𝑝(𝑣) obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, with the 
consequence that its peak was slightly shifted to the right of the rating scale (Fig 2b,c).  
We selected two levels of encoding noise 𝜎 based on the noise levels observed in 
Experiment 1 (see Supplementary Note 4 for a detailed discussion of the relation between 
encoding noise and the specific bias pattern). The simulations predicted biases for long 
exposure times (low 𝜎, black line in Figure 3a) and short exposure times (high	𝜎, red line 
in Fig. 3a) that are markedly different once the value estimates have been mapped onto 
the bounded rating scale via	𝑔(𝑣"). Crucially, the difference between these two predictions 
(high and low 𝜎) is independent of 𝑣): (𝑣"4high − 𝑣)) − (𝑣"4low − 𝑣)) = 𝑣"4high − 𝑣"4low. (1) 
Figure 3b shows that simulated rating trials with short exposure time (i.e., high 𝜎) have 
stronger repulsive (“anti-Bayesian”) biases near the center of the prior (intersection point 
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to the right of the center of the rating scale), but also stronger attraction biases when 𝑣) 
is further away from the peak of the prior. For values close to the prior, this prediction 
agrees with previous work showing repulsive noise-related biases in perceptual tasks9; 
however, as 𝑣) moves away from the prior, our simulations predict the opposite tendency 
(attraction) that would also be expected based on classical Bayesian frameworks.  
 We devised a behavioral paradigm (Experiment 3) to investigate whether these 
model-predicted biases are in fact observed for subjective value estimations. Healthy 
individuals (n=24) rated goods with similar procedures as in Experiment 1. However, for 
the first round of ratings, a randomly determined half of the goods for each participant 
were presented for a duration of 900 ms and the other half for a duration of 2600 ms. 
Participants did not know whether a given item was going to be presented for the short 
or long duration. In the second round of ratings, the presentation durations were inverted 
for each good, but participants did not know that this second round was going to take 
place (see methods for further details). Thus, participants were not able to predict the 
presentation times of individual items and could not develop differential information 
sampling strategies for items with long vs short presentation times. On each trial, the 
rating scale was presented just after the image had disappeared from the screen (see 
Figure 1a), and participants were instructed to then provide their rating as fast as possible 
(mean RTs of 1.53±0.45 and 1.39±0.4 for low and high exposure times, respectively, see 
Supplementary Fig. 6). Thus, the effective sampling time (time from the onset of stimulus 
presentation until response) was 1.53±0.4 s longer for long exposure times 
(βRandEffects=1.4±0.08, P<0.001; Supplementary Fig. 6), supporting our assumption that 
participants could draw a higher number of samples (and therefore reduce internal noise 
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in the value representations) for images with long exposure times. We computed the 
difference in the ratings between short and long durations and plotted this difference as 
a function of the rating of the long duration (Fig. 3c). The results of this analysis match 
the non-intuitive quantitative predictions of the efficient coding model (Fig. 3b), in showing 
systematic repulsion for the four data points near the peak of the prior and attraction for 
the other values that are further away from the prior (Supplementary Fig. 7). Note that the 
repulsion effect that is both predicted and observed at the center of the scale here is not 
confined to always be at this location - its location and extent over the rating scale 
depends on the interaction of the three key parameters of our model: The prior location, 
prior shape, and level of encoding noise (Supplementary Note 4). 
Control analyses confirmed that our results are not caused by systematic temporal 
order effects (no difference in value ratings between the first and second rounds for each 
of the exposure times; paired t-tests, all P>0.18). We also compared the accuracy of our 
model’s predictions to that of control models in which we factorially varied all possible 
sources of noise that could in principle have affected the ratings (pre-encoding noise, 
efficient-coding noise, post-encoding noise, and lapses). Models without efficient coding 
lead to very different predictions that are not supported by our empirical data 
(Supplementary Fig. 8). In order to test this quantitatively, we performed a factorial model 
comparison to quantify the strength of empirical support given by our data for the 
presence of each noise source (Supplementary Fig. 9 and Supplementary Table 1). This 
revealed that the only noise source reliably accounting for the variation in subjective value 
estimation due to time pressure is internal noise in efficient coding (Bayes Factor > 100; 
see Supplementary Fig. 9). This strongly suggests that the biases in subjective value 
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estimates observed in Experiment 3 originate in the efficient-coding operations formalized 
in our model.    
Confidence in subjective valuation 
It has been suggested that the perceived confidence in subjective value reports reflects 
a second-order judgement (the confidence rating) about a first-order judgment (the 
subjective value rating)15. However, two important issues have remained unaddressed. 
First, previous work has not explicitly defined a generative model of the encoding and 
decoding of value representations; second-order statements about these ratings would 
therefore be subject to the same problems curtailing the validity of the ratings themselves. 
Second, previous work has remained agnostic about both the information structure of 
values in the environment and capacity limitations. We therefore tested whether the 
reported confidence in subjective value estimations can be predicted based on the 
encoding/decoding process proposed here.  
We conducted a new experiment (Experiment 4) in which participants provided 
value ratings as in experiment 1, but they now also gave a confidence rating after each 
value rating (Fig. 4a). We inferred the subjective values 𝑣(,,⋯,1) exactly as for Experiments 
1 and 2. Once again we found a shift of the expected prior (i.e., its mean) towards higher 
values alongside higher rating variability for higher than low-rated items (hierarchical 
linear regression of rating variability for each item vs. mean rated value: βRandEffects= -
0.18±0.04, P<0.001). Based on these results, we derived three qualitative predictions for 
the confidence ratings based on the definitions of confidence formulated above. First, 
confidence should be higher for rating values near the extremes of the rating scale (Fig. 
4d), reflecting the transformation from the subjective space to the bounded scale. This 
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prediction is in line with previous work15. Second, given the shift of the prior density 
towards higher subjective values (Fig. 4c), the efficient coding framework predicts that 
the second-order judgement of the posterior probability perceived in the rating scale 
should decrease for item values towards the right side of the rating scale; confidence 
reports should therefore be higher for items with higher subjective value (Fig. 4d). Third, 
because lower levels of variability in the rating estimates generate narrower posterior 
distributions, the average variability of each participant’s ratings should be negatively 
related to her general level of confidence.  
The data (see Figure 4e,f) confirm all three predictions. First, confidence increases 
for values closer to the extremes of the rating scale (quadratic effect 
βRandEffects=0.41±0.03, P<0.001). Second, confidence was higher for higher model-
predicted subjective values 𝑣6 (βRandEffects=0.22±0.070, P=0.002). This runs counter to 
previous suggestions15 that confidence ratings should be symmetric with respect to the 
center of the rating scale: Both our model and empirical data reveal that this is not 
necessarily the case, as the confidence ratings depend on the prior distribution 
(Supplementary Table 2). Third, across participants, the higher the variability in the 
subjective value estimations, the less confident the participants are (βrobust = -0.59, 
P<0.0011). Crucially, this regression analysis controls for the mean value ratings for each 
participant (Fig. 4f), thereby confirming our model predictions that confidence relates to 
rating variability independently of how valuable the participants rated the items. Finally, 
to test these model predictions more quantitatively for the observed data using our 
framework, we implemented 11 different proposed models of how confidence may be 
derived15,33–35 from the posterior distributions of rating values given by our framework (see 
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full details of the model specifications in Supplementary Table 2). Crucially, we fixed both 
the parameters of the prior distribution and values 𝑣(,,⋯,1) for each participant to the 
values obtained by fitting the model to her prior rating data. We found that a model based 
on the statistical definition of confidence (i.e., the probability that the rating is correct33,34) 
provided the best fit to the empirical confidence reports (Fig 4e, Supplementary Table 2). 
These results confirm that our efficient-coding model can capture the value inference 
processes that underlie not only subjective value estimates but also the reported 
confidence in these estimates.  
 
Discussion 
Our work demonstrates that variability, biases, and confidence in preference-based 
choices are all consistent with information-maximizing transmission and statistically 
optimal decoding of values by a limited-capacity system. This suggests that principles 
governing the encoding and interpretation of low-level sensory signals are also relevant 
when humans report and choose based on subjective preferences. More specifically, our 
results support theoretical proposals according to which, just as in the case of sensory 
systems, subjective value systems optimize the use of limited resources for processing 
value information and exploit environmental regularities in order to guide preference-
based decisions16,17,19. Thus, our findings provide a fundamental step toward a unified 
account of how humans perceive and valuate the environment in order to optimally guide 
behavior. 
Our work introduces a new framework that may serve to improve the modelling 
and prediction of preference-based decision making, and more generally any cognitive 
process that involves fully subjective value estimations (such as pain36 and health37 
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perception, to mention only two examples). We demonstrate that the common practice of 
using value ratings as inputs to decision models11,12,14,15,27–29 is suboptimal, since these 
reports should be just as variable and biased as the choices that the experimenter wants 
to model. This is not a trivial issue, as both ratings and choices can be subject to complex 
non-linearities due to the encoding/decoding strategies implemented by the valuation 
system. Our model provides a solution to this problem, since it makes it possible to 
employ a single set of ratings to determine both the observer’s subjective values and their 
underlying prior distribution, while simultaneously accounting for capacity limitations. 
These parameters and values can then be used to predict fully independent preference-
based decisions with higher accuracy than existing standard approaches in the literature. 
This procedure differs from traditional economic approaches that derive preferences 
directly from observed choices38 and that ignore the processes involved in estimating 
subjective values (and the associated sources of variability). Our results show that this 
ignorance is not warranted; a detailed understanding of these processes should be a 
critical aspect to consider in theories of decision making and economic behavior39.   
In our model specification, variability in subjective value estimates and choices 
emerges from both internal noise in the coding of value and unspecific (external) noise in 
the decision process. This perspective is fundamentally different from standard 
approaches where preference variability is solely attributed to unspecified noise in the 
decision process (e.g., noise added to deterministic value functions13 through the 
application of a softmax function or diffusion noise in sequential sampling models11–13). 
Based on our empirical and modelling work, we argue that positing unspecified sources 
of noise in the decision process may be insufficient, given that accounting for noise 
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involved in the coding of value appears to be crucial for deriving more accurate predictions 
of economic decisions21. Even though some characteristics of the models used for this 
purpose (e.g., encoding rules and loss function of the Bayesian encoder) may be refined 
by future research on both perception40 and subjective valuation23, our findings clearly 
illustrate the general utility of this approach.  
In some respects, our model of the coding of value resembles the one posited by 
decision-by-sampling theory41. That theory proposes that estimated subjective values 
directly reflect samples drawn from an internal noisy representation of value, but unlike in 
our approach, no optimal Bayesian decoding is assumed. As a consequence, decision-
by-sampling theory cannot account for our finding that biases in valuation are changed 
by time pressure, since drawing fewer samples should lead to value estimates that are 
noisier, but not different on average. This contrasts with the predictions of the framework 
presented here, which we show to be fully congruent with the empirically observed biases 
under time pressure. 
Our results support the idea that reported confidence in subjective value 
estimations is well captured by a statistical measure of confidence33,34. While a recently 
proposed framework15 provides an elegant model of confidence judgments for individual 
value estimates, it does not provide a precise account of what information should actually 
be encoded but focuses only on what may be decoded. Additionally, that framework does 
not account for the effects of capacity limitations in information processing and the 
distribution of object values in the environment. Our work provides a more comprehensive 
characterization, by demonstrating that the same efficient coding framework that 
accounts for biases and variability in subjective value estimates and choices also 
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accounts for the reported confidence in these value estimates. In general, we hope that 
these results may motivate researchers to further develop explicit process models of 
metacognition42. 
While our work highlights similarities between perceptual and value inference, it 
has remained agnostic as to how the internal response used for this purpose is derived 
from low- and high-level sensory signals. Understanding such feature extraction will be 
important for characterizing how the internal value response may be constructed, e.g. by 
sampling from memory30,43 and emotion systems44. While we formally demonstrate that 
the precision of encoded subjective values in capacity-limited systems may relate to the 
number of discrete samples that can be drawn (e.g., from memory or emotion systems), 
we have so far only focused on the encoding and readout of simple one-dimensional 
subjective values associated with an object. However, the framework used here could be 
parsimoniously extended to incorporate a whole range of lower-level sensory signals and 
to encompass more complex hierarchical structures. Despite this interesting challenge to 
further understanding the construction of preferences10, it is remarkable that a simple 
normative specification inspired by fundamental principles of low-level sensory perception 
can capture important aspects of preference-based decisions.    
Bayesian models have often been criticized for allowing an arbitrary choice of prior 
and likelihood functions, as a consequence of which it is suggested that their predictions 
are vacuous45. However, in this study we have shown that by fully constraining the 
decision model to the distribution of object values – while taking account of capacity 
constraints – it is possible to accurately capture preference-based choice behavior using 
a parsimonious model. In line with previous work on low-level sensory perception4,9, our 
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results demonstrate that the above-mentioned critique is not always valid. This should 
motivate researchers to pursue the identification of optimal solutions to computational 
problems posed by the environment – in both perception and subjective valuation – 
without ignoring the fact that biological systems are by definition limited in their capacity 
to process information. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that resource-constrained models inspired by 
models of perception3,9,16 may have far-reaching implications not only in neuroscience, 
but also in psychology16,46–48 and economics19,21,48–50. Such models offer the prospect of 
explanations for seemingly irrational aspects of choice behavior, grounded in the need to 
represent the world with only finite precision. Recent work suggests that features of 
economic decisions such as risk aversion21 and preference reversals19 can be understood 
as further examples of biases resulting from optimal Bayesian inference from imprecise 
internal representations of value. This supports our emphasis on the desirability of 
developing models of decision making that account simultaneously for the goals of the 
organism, its environment, and its biological constraints.  
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Figure 1. Simplified schema of the value inference model. a) Observers infer the true 
value 𝑣 of a food item by Bayesian inference constrained by efficient coding. The 
perceived food item with value value 𝑣 elicits an internal response 𝑟. The corresponding  
likelihood function 𝑝(𝑟|𝑣) is constrained by the prior belief 𝑝(𝑣) via efficient coding. In this 
example, the prior 𝑝(𝑣) matches the distribution of subjective values 𝑣 of supermarket 
products. The prior is combined with the likelihood to generate a posterior distribution 𝑝(𝑣|𝑟) via Bayes rule, to generate a subjective value estimate 𝑣"(𝑟). This estimate is 
subsequently mapped to the bounded rating scale imposed by the experimenter, resulting 
in an observed rating 𝑣*. Crucially, unlike for experiments of perception, the experimenter 
has no access to the “true” stimulus value 𝑣 that the participant uses to generate a rating. 
b,c) Choice consistency predictions as a function of the rating scale position (right plots 
in each panel) for two different priors (depicted on left of each panel). Prior distributions 
with higher density over low subjective values lead to higher choice consistency for low-
valued goods (panel b); on the other hand, prior distributions with higher density over high 
subjective values lead to higher choice consistency for higher valued goods (panel c). 
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Figure 2. Paradigm and results for Experiments 1 and 2. a) Example display from the 
preference rating phase (two rounds) during which the participants rated their preference 
to eat the displayed food item using a continuous scale (Experiment 1, n=38) or a discrete 
scale with numerical cues (Experiment 2, n=37). The lower-left panel shows an example 
display from the decision-making task requiring participants to choose which of the two 
items (upper or lower) they preferred to consume after the experiment. (b) Left panels 
show rating variability plotted as a function of each item’s mean rating across both rounds 
for experiment 1 (black dots show the mean across participants; dot error bars represent 
the s.e.m. across participants). Based on our model fits, we simulated 500 experiments 
in which we draw N=2 ratings for each good and plot the simulated rating variability as a 
function of the mean rating (semi-transparent red lines). Right panels show that posterior 
estimates of the expected value of the prior are shifted towards higher rating values (the 
zero position maps to the center of the rating scale). c) Same as panel b but for 
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experiment 2. d) Standardized estimates from multiple logistic regression show that the 
higher the value difference VD between the mean ratings, the more consistent the 
choices. Crucially, the higher the variability in the ratings of the alternatives, the less 
consistent the decisions. Total value of the two ratings of each good OV = 𝑣*, + 𝑣*. had no 
reliable influence on choices across the two experiments. Error bars in this panel 
represent the 95% highest-density interval of the posterior estimates. (*) P<0.05; (***) 
P<0.001. e,f) The trial-to-trial effect shown in panel d was also reflected across 
participants, as the general level of variability in the rating task correlated negatively with 
the slope of a logistic regression (experiment 1: panel e, βrobust = -0.77±0.20, P<0.001; 
experiment 2: panel f, βrobust = -1.2±0.25, P<0.001). g,h) Observed data (red dots) match 
the model predictions (blue dots), plotted as a function of the two items’ absolute value 
difference (|𝑣*, − 𝑣*.| in 10-tiles, left panels) and overall value (𝑣*, + 𝑣*. in quartiles, right 
panels) (panel g: Experiment 1; panel h: Experiment 2). Lower and upper boxplot hinges 
correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile and each semitransparent dot represents the 
data of one participant. 
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Figure 3. Illusion of preference (Experiment 3). a) Model-predicted biases for two 
degrees of internal measurement noise (𝜎) during subjective-value estimations: high (red, 
generated by short valuation exposure) and low (black, generated by long valuation 
exposure). b) Model-predicted differences of the biases for high and low 𝜎 across the 
value rating scale. c) Difference of the empirical estimates between low and high 
exposure times (n=24, mean data are black dots with s.e.m. across participants, blue line 
interpolates these data for visualization). Note the qualitative and quantitative overlap with 
the model prediction in panel b. This suggests that human valuation exhibits complex 
illusions of subjective preference, as predicted by the Bayesian and efficient coding 
hypothesis (see also Supplementary Fig. 7). Lower and upper boxplot hinges correspond 
to the 25th and 75th percentile and each semitransparent dot represents the data of one 
participant. 
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Figure 4. Confidence (Experiment 4). a) Participants (n=28) provided value ratings as 
in experiments 1 and 2, but also rated their confidence in the value ratings. b) Rating 
variability plotted as a function of each item’s mean rating across both rounds (solid black 
dots) was higher for low-rated items (β= -0.18±0.04, P<0.001). c) Posterior estimates of 
the expected value of the prior are shifted towards higher rating values (the zero position 
maps to the center of the rating scale). d) Posterior densities were constructed for four 
symmetric subjective values 𝑣 (different colors) in the unbounded subjective scale. Group 
of densities on the left (light colors) and right side (dark colors) reflect low and high 
subjective values, respectively. Given the expected value of the prior (panel c), the 
efficient-coding model predicts lower levels of confidence for low-rated goods (relatively 
wide posteriors; light colors) than for high-rated goods (relatively narrower posteriors; 
dark colors). e) Empirical confidence ratings (solid red dots) match the predictions (blue 
dots) of the best-fitting confidence model (red; see also Supplementary Table 2) across 
different value ratings (x-axis). Confidence was higher for higher model-predicted 
subjective values (βRandEffects=0.22±0.070, P=0.002). f) Confidence relates to value-rating 
variability (shown is the partial correlation after controlling for rating value). As predicted 
by the model, these two metrics are negatively correlated (r = -0.59, p<0.001). Dots 
represent the data of single participants, the blue line represents the identified correlation 
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line, and the shaded area the 95% confidence interval of this line. In all other plots, error 
bars around data points represent s.e.m. across participants. Lower and upper boxplot 
hinges correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile and each semitransparent dot 
represents the data of one participant. 
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Methods 
Participants. The study tested healthy young volunteers (total n=127, age 19-37 years, 55 
females: n=38 in experiment 1, 17 females; n=37 new participants in experiment 2 (replication of 
results obtained in experiment 1), 14 females; n=24 new participants in experiment 3, 11 females; 
and n=28 new participants in experiment 4, 13 females). Participants were randomly assigned to 
each experiment. No data was excluded from the analyses. Sample size was determined based 
on previous studies using similar stimuli and tasks11,51. Participants were instructed about all 
aspects of the experiment and gave written informed consent. None of the participants suffered 
from any neurological or psychological disorder or took medication that interfered with 
participation in our study. Participants received monetary compensation for their participation in 
the experiment, in addition to receiving one food item in the decision-making task (see below). 
The experiments conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki and the experimental protocol was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich. 
For all experiments, participants were asked not to eat or drink anything for 3 hours before the 
start of the experiment. After the experiment, participants were required to stay in the room with 
the experimenter while eating the food item that they had chosen in a randomly selected trial of 
the decision-making task (see below). All experiments took place between 9am and 5pm. Our 
experiments did not include different conditions determined a priori by the experimenter, since 
the participants themselves sorted trials into conditions as a direct consequence of their ratings 
and choices given during the experiment. Blinding was therefore neither necessary nor possible. 
Value rating task. Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of three main phases: (1) rating phase 1, (2) 
rating phase 2, and (3) the decision-making task. In rating phase 1, we asked the participants to 
provide subjective preference ratings for a set of 64 food items using an on-screen slider scale 
(Figure 2a). All of the food items were in stock in our lab and participants were notified about this. 
Importantly, participants saw all food products before the ratings so that they could effectively use 
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the full range of the rating scale. Moreover, participants knew that all products were randomly 
drawn from the two biggest supermarkets in Switzerland. Based on pilot measurements and 
previous studies11,51 in our lab, we selected food items that varied all the way from items that most 
participants would find unappealing (e.g., raw broccoli) to items that most participants would find 
highly appetitive (e.g., ice cream). This was important as our model should capture the full range 
of subjective values that humans typically assign to food items on a daily basis. During the ratings, 
participants indicated “how much they wanted to eat the presented food item at the end of the 
experiment”. The slider scale was continuous in experiment 1 with no numbers displayed (Fig. 
2a), whereas the rating scale in experiment 2 was divided in 20 steps of equal size with numbers 
displayed under each step (Fig. 2a). This was done to ensure that the effects observed in 
Experiment 1 did not reflect the absence of reference points in the middle of the rating scale. 
Participants were informed that the rightmost endpoint would indicate items that they would most 
love to eat, whereas the leftmost endpoint would indicate items that they would most hate to eat. 
The initial location of the slider was randomized for each item to reduce anchoring effects. 
Rating phase 2 was identical to rating phase 1 and took place immediately after phase 1. The 
order of the items’ presentation was randomized. Crucially, participants were not informed before 
the rating phase 1 that a second rating phase and a decision-making task would take place. This 
was important as it prevented participants from actively memorizing the location of the rating in 
the slider in the first phase, thus providing us with a clean measure of the variability in the value 
estimates.   
In Experiment 3, participants provided value ratings as in Experiment 1, but for the first round of 
ratings, half of the goods were presented with a duration of 900 ms and the second half with a 
duration of 2600 ms. For the second round of ratings, the presentation durations were inverted 
for each good. The exposure time (900 ms or 2600 ms) was pseudo-randomly selected for each 
good in the first round of ratings, and participants did not know in advance for how long they were 
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going to see each specific food item. The rating scale appeared only once the image disappeared 
from the screen (see Figure 1a), and the participants were instructed to provide their rating as 
fast as possible (mean RTs 1.53±0.45 and 1.39±0.4 for low and high exposure times, 
respectively). Crucially, participants were not informed in advance about the details of the time 
manipulations. 
In Experiment 4, participants provided value ratings as in experiment 1, but indicated after each 
rating their confidence in their first-order rating (Fig. 4a). Following procedures of previous work15, 
we informed participants that the leftmost side of the rating scale means “Not at all” confident and 
the rightmost side means “Totally” confident. 
Choice task. For Experiments 1 and 2, immediately after the two rating phases, an algorithm 
selected a balanced set of decision trials divided into four value difference levels on the rating 
scale (rating difference ~5%, ~10%, ~15% and ~20% of the length of the rating scale), as defined 
by the average rating across phases 1 and 2 provided by each participant. Decision-making trials 
started with central presentation of a fixation cross for 1-2 seconds. Immediately after this, two 
food items were displayed simultaneously, one in the upper and one in the lower hemifield (Fig. 
2a). The food items were presented until response and participants had up to four seconds to 
make a choice. Participants were instructed to choose which of the two items (upper or lower) 
they preferred to consume at the end of the experiment. To make these choices, participants 
pressed one of two buttons on a standard keyboard with their right-index finger (upper item) or 
their right thumb (lower item). In Experiments 1 and 2, we defined a consistent choice as a trial in 
which the subject chose the item with a higher mean rating from the prior rating phase. Each 
experimental session comprised a maximum of 240 trials (this depended on the rating distribution 
of each participant) divided into 6 runs of 40 trials each. The trials were fully balanced across 
rating-difference levels (~5%, ~10%, ~15% and ~20% of the length of the rating scale) and 
location of consistent response option (Up or Down). 
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Model 
We assume that the presentation of an object with stimulus value 𝑣 elicits an internal noisy 
response 𝑟 (encoding) that the observer uses to generate a subjective value estimate 𝑣"(𝑟) – the 
decoded stimulus value. At the encoding stage, a function 𝐹(𝑣) maps the stimulus space to a new 
space where the Fisher information is uniform over the entire real line. This requires the definition 𝐹(𝑣) = ∫ 	=) 𝑝(𝜒)𝑑𝜒 for 𝑣 > 0      (2) 𝐹(𝑣) = −∫ 	)= 𝑝(𝜒)𝑑𝜒 for 𝑣 < 0, (3) 
where 𝑝(𝜒) is an improper prior distribution, so that 𝐹(𝑣) → ∞ as 𝑣 → ∞, and 𝐹(𝑣) → −∞ as 𝑣 →−∞. We assume that conditional on the value	𝑣, an internal noisy (neural) response is generated 𝑟 = 𝐹(𝑣) + 𝛿        (4) 
with  𝛿 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎.), where 𝜎 measures the degree of noise in the internal representation that is 
constant over all possible values	𝐹(𝑣). We also note that the prior distribution for possible values 
of 𝐹(𝑣) is uniform on the real line. The posterior mean estimate of 𝐹(𝑣) (the estimator that 
minimizes mean squared error) is then given by  
𝑣"(𝑟) = E[𝐹H,(𝑟 + 𝜖,)]        (5) 
with 𝜖, ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎.). Here E[.] means the expectation over possible values of 𝜖,. This estimator is 
a deterministic function that maps each measurement 𝑟 to an estimated subjective value 𝑣"(𝑟); 
this deterministic mapping therefore cannot account for trial-to-trial fluctuation in the value 
estimates. The variability in the value estimates arises because of the variability in the 
measurement 𝑟 on each trial. Accounting for this variability, it follows that for any true stimulus 𝑣), 
the mean estimate should be given by 
E[𝑣"|𝑣)] = E[𝐹H,(𝐹(𝑣)) + 𝜖, + 𝜖.)]  (6) 
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with 𝜖. ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎.). E[.] now means the expectation over possible values of (𝜖, + 𝜖.) ∼ 𝑁(0,2𝜎.). 
In the small-noise limit, we can take a second-order Taylor expansion: 𝐹H,(𝐹(𝑣)) + 𝜖) ≈ 𝐹H,(𝐹(𝑣))) + 𝜙N ⋅ 𝜖 + (1/2)𝜙R ⋅ 𝜖., (7) 
where 𝜖 ≡ 𝜖, + 𝜖., 𝜙(𝑣T) ≡ 𝐹H,(𝑣T) and the derivatives of 𝜙(𝑣T) are evaluated at 𝑣T) = 𝐹(𝑣)). Taking 
the expected value over possible realizations of 𝜖, we obtain 𝑣" ≈ 𝑣) + 𝜙N ⋅ 𝜖. + (1/2)𝜙R ⋅ (𝜎. + 𝜖..). (8) 
Conditional on a particular stimulus value 𝑣), this is a random variable with expected value 
E[𝑣"|𝑣)] ≈ 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎.          (9) 
and variance 
Var[𝑣"|𝑣)] ≈ (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎..   (10) 
If we approximate this distribution by a normal distribution with the mean and variance just 
calculated above, we would obtain a probability density for 𝑣" given by 𝑝(𝑣"; 𝑣), 𝜃, 𝜎) = 𝑁(𝑣"; 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎.),  (11) 
where 𝜃 is a set of parameters of the prior distribution (see below). This expression is the 
likelihood of a given subjective value estimate 𝑣" conditioned on a true stimulus value 𝑣). If one 
wants to write the joint likelihood of a pair of values (𝑣", 𝑣)) occurring when 𝑣) is drawn from the 
prior, one obtains 𝑝joint(𝑣"; 𝑣), 𝜃, 𝜎) = 𝑁(𝑣"; 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎.) ⋅ 𝐹N(𝑣)). (12) 
In addition to internal noise in the coding of value	𝜎, we also account for late noise in the decision 
stage (i.e., post-decoding noise), which may capture any unspecific forms of downstream noise 
occurring during the response process that are unrelated to valuation per se. We assume this late 
noise to be normally distributed; therefore, it can be easily added to our model as follows (see 
Supplementary Note 1 for further discussion on the different sources of noise) 𝑝joint(𝑣"	; 𝑣), 𝜃, 𝜎, 𝜎ext) = 𝑁(𝑣"	; 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎. + 𝜎ext) ⋅ 𝐹N(𝑣)).    (13) 
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The last part of the model defines the probability distribution in the space of the bounded rating 
scale. Without loss of generality, we assume that this scale is bounded from 0 to 1, with a 
monotonic mapping of subjective preference values that preserves preference ordering. 
Transforming the unbounded internal scale to this bounded physical scale requires a mapping 
that preserves monotonicity. A convenient and relatively simple function allowing this 
transformation is the logistic function: 𝑣* = 𝑔(𝑣") = 1/(1 + 𝑒H="	), which provides a one-to-one 
mapping of the estimate 𝑣"	 from the subjective to the physical scale on any given trial. The implied 
joint probability density (𝑣*, 𝑣)) on the rating scale is thus given by 𝑝*(𝑣*; 𝑣), 𝜃, 𝜎, 𝜎ext) = 𝑁(𝑔H,(𝑣*); 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎. + 𝜎ext) ⋅ 𝐹N(𝑣)) ⋅ (𝑔H,(𝑣*))′        (14) 
Here the inverse mapping of the subjective to the unbounded scale is given by  𝑔H,(𝑣*) = log Y =*,H=*Z, (15) 
and its first derivative is (𝑔H,(𝑣*))N = ,=*H=*[. (16) 
Recall that we are assuming here that the decision maker maximizes mutual information between 
the input stimulus and the noisy measurement, therefore 𝐹(𝑣) is defined as the cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the prior distribution 𝑝(𝑣). Here we assume that the prior follows a logistic 
distribution  𝑝(𝑣; 𝜇, 𝑠) = ,^_ sech.((𝑣 − 𝜇)/(2𝑠)),  (17) 
where 𝜇 and 𝑠 represent the mean and scale, respectively. The advantage of using this distribution 
is that its CDF and both the first and the second derivative of the quantile function have closed-
form solutions; however, any similar prior distribution could be used without greatly affecting the 
quantitative predictions presented here.	𝐹(𝑣), 𝜙(𝑣T)N and 𝜙(𝑣T)R  are given by: 
𝐹(𝑣) = ,. `1 + tanh Y=Ha._ Zb, (18) 𝜙(𝑣T)N = _=T(,H=T),  (19) 
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 𝜙(𝑣T)R = _(.=TH,)=T[(,H=T)[ (20) 
Thus, for any experimental data set consisting of M goods and N value ratings for each good, we 
can find the set of parameters of the prior, the internal valuation noise 𝜎, external noise 𝜎ext, and 
the “true” stimulus values 𝑣(,,⋯,1) that maximize the likelihood of the observed set of ratings (under 
the constraint that 𝑣(,,⋯,1) is distributed following 𝑝(𝑣)).  
 In order to compute choice consistency predictions that an experimenter would obtain 
when performing such analysis in the rating scale (Fig. 1b,c), we first computed for a fine-grained 
sequence of subjective values 𝑣)  their corresponding expected value and variance perceived in 
the rating scale (if we assume that the experimenter can obtain a large number of ratings for each 
good) via   𝜇=* = ∫ 𝑔(𝑣) ⋅ 𝑁(𝑣"; 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎. + 𝜎ext)𝑑𝑣  (21) 
and 𝜎=*. = ∫ [𝑔(𝑣) − 𝜇=*]. ⋅ 𝑁(𝑣"; 𝑣) + 𝜙R ⋅ 𝜎., (𝜙N). ⋅ 𝜎. + 𝜎ext)𝑑𝑣,  (22) 
where the subscript (𝑣*) reflects the expected value (𝜇=* ) and variance (𝜎=*.) at position 𝑣* in the 
rating scale. We then looked for expected values 𝜇=*  closer to the values [0.1,0.11,0.12,…0.89,0.9] 
and used their corresponding variance to approximate the level of choice consistency as follows: gΦ` aijklHaijm4ijkln4ijb + Φ` aijHaijolm4ijoln4ijbp /2, (23) 
with 𝛿 = 0.05 (note that different values of 𝛿 move the accuracy curve up or down but does not 
affect the general u-shaped curve obtained in our predictions; see Fig. 1b,c). 
 
Behavioral analyses and statistics 
Preference-rating variability in Experiments 1 (n=38), 2 (n=37) and 4 (n=28) was computed as the 
standard deviation (SD) for each item across the rating phases 1 and 2. To visualize this effect, 
we plotted the SD as a function of the mean rating (Figs. 2b,c; 4b). To investigate the influence 
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of both VD and rating variability on the consistency of choices (Fig. 2d), we performed a 
hierarchical logistic mixed-effects regression of choices (defining consistent=1, inconsistent=0) on 
three main regressors of interest, namely: value difference (VD), summed-variability (Var, defined 
as the sum of the two SDs of the two food items presented in each trial), and the summed-value 
(OV, defined as the sum of mean rating values of the two food items presented in each trial). All 
regressors of interest were included in the same model. Similarly, all the population-level 
regressions described for Experiment 4 were based on a hierarchical linear mixed-effects 
regression approach.  All mixed-effects regressions in this study had varying subject-specific 
constants and slopes (i.e., random-effects analysis). Posterior inference of the parameters in 
the hierarchical models was performed via the Gibbs sampler using the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) technique implemented in JAGS52, assuming flat priors for both the mean and 
the noise of the estimates. For each model a total of 10,000 samples were drawn from an initial 
burn-in step and subsequently a total of new 10,000 samples were drawn with three chains 
(each chain was derived based on a different random number generator engine, and each with 
a different seed). We applied a thinning of 10 to this final sample, thus resulting in a final set 
of 1,000 samples for each parameter. We conducted Gelman–Rubin tests53 for each parameter 
to confirm convergence of the chains. All latent variables in our Bayesian models had 𝑅s < 1.05, 
which suggests that all three chains converged to a target posterior distribution. We checked 
via visual inspection that the posterior population level distributions of the final MCMC chains 
converged to our assumed parametrizations. The “p-values” reported for these regressions are 
not frequentist p-values but instead directly quantify the probability of the reported effect 
differing from zero. They were computed using the posterior population distributions estimated 
for each parameter and represent the portion of the cumulative density functions that lies 
above/below 0 (depending on the direction of the effect). The regressions across participants 
reported for Experiments 1,2 and 4 were computed using robust linear regressions using the 
rlm function54 implemented in the statistical computing software R55. 
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In order to fit the efficient coding model to the rating data in Experiments 1, 2 and 4, we 
found the stimulus values 𝑣(,,⋯,1), parameters of the prior 𝜃, encoding noise 𝜎 and external noise 𝜎ext	  that maximized the likelihood function 𝑝(𝑣*6; 𝑣6, 𝜃, 𝜎, 𝜎ext) (Eq. 14) of the observed set of 
ratings for each participant under the constraint that 𝑣(,,⋯,1) is distributed following 𝑝(𝑣; 𝜃) 
(Supplementary Fig. 1). Alternatively, defining 𝑣T ≡ 𝐹(𝑣), one can find the values estimates in the 
efficient space 𝑣T(,,⋯,1) under the constraint that these are uniformly distributed. Using either 
approach, we found nearly identical results for the fitted parameters, which is expected for correct 
model specification. Posterior inference of the parameters for this model can be conveniently 
performed via the Gibbs sampler. 
We used the stimulus values 𝑣(,,⋯,1)  and prior parameters 𝜃 fitted to the rating in order 
to predict choices in the two-alternative choice task in Experiments 1 and 2. Following our 
modelling specification, over many trials the probability that an agent chooses an alternative with 
stimulus value 𝑣, over a second alternative with stimulus value 𝑣. is given by: 
P(𝑣", > 𝑣".|𝑣,, 𝑣.) = Φt E[="u|=u]HE[="[|=[]vVar[="u|=u]nVar[="[|=[]n.4ext[ w, (24) 
where  Φ() is the CDF of the standard normal distribution and the expressions for E[.] and Var[.] 
are given in Eqs. 9 and 10 (see above). In other words, the input values of the choice model are 
fully constrained by the efficient coding model based on the fits to the rating data and therefore 
the choice model has only two free parameters, namely the resource noise of the encoder 𝜎 and 
the external noise 𝜎ext	 . Fits to the choice data were performed via the Gibbs sampler using a 
hierarchical Bayesian model assuming flat priors for both noise terms. When evaluating different 
models, we are interested in our model’s predictive accuracy for unobserved data, thus it is 
important to choose a metric for model comparison that considers this predictive aspect. 
Therefore, in order to perform model comparison, we used a method for approximating leave-
one-out cross-validation (LOO) that uses samples from the full posterior56. The smaller the LOO 
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the better the fit. We found that in Experiments 1 and 2, the best model was the efficient-coding 
model. Crucially, this finding is fully replicated when using a different Bayesian metric such as the 
wAIC56. Description of the different choice models tested here is presented in Supplementary 
Note 1. 
 
 
Reporting Summary. 
Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary 
linked to this article. 
 
Data availability 
The data that support the findings of this study and the analysis code are available from the 
corresponding author upon request. 
 
Code availability 
Code to infer subjective values and prior parameters based on rating data is provided in the 
Supplementary Software file. 
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